harms and cognizable competitive benefits. These economic questions can be used to flesh out the economic framework of the Competitor Collaboration Guidelines.
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The Checklist is organized as follows. Section A focuses on potential competitive harms. Section B then turns to potential competitive benefits. Section C focuses on the determination of net competitive effects. This sequencing roughly corresponds to the burden-shifting formulation of the rule of reason. However, it is important to note that this sequencing should not be approached rigidly. A finding of a lack of efficiency benefits might suggest that the motivation of the JV is to achieve and exercise market power to the detriment of consumers, thereby supporting an inference of harm. 12 Moreover, under a quick look to condemn standard, efficiency benefits are examined first, albeit with a possibly lower burden of proof on the JV. If that proof fails, answering some of these harm questions may turn out to be unnecessary as a matter of law under this quick look standard.
13

A. Potential Competitive Harms
A JV and its specific restraints can lead to harms to consumers and the competitive process. These harms can arise through collusive or exclusionary effects. The following questions focus on potential competitive harms under the interim assumption that the restraints do not have any competitive benefits. Procompetitive efficiency benefits are discussed in the following section. J. 269 (2015) . Evidence indicating lack of procompetitive purpose suggests that the purpose and effect of a firm or JV's conduct is to create market power that can lead to competitive harms. Thus, evidence that the JV lacks cognizable efficiency benefits in principle could strengthen an inference of harm. This is also a decision theory rationale for focusing first on efficiency benefits in the quick look to condemn standard. 13 For example, see NCAA, supra note 3.
below also apply to JVs involving vertically related or complementary product producers, for example, a JV comprised of a pool of complementary patents. Even if the JV members are not formally restrained by the JV, they may lack incentives to compete because they would not want to disrupt the profit potential of the JV. For example, if the only two firms in a market formed a JV produced a product similar to that of the JV, the individual firms each unilaterally might choose to forgo independent competition that would lead to lower prices. Incentives to compete would depend on the number of JV members, their respective ownership interests in the JV (both financial interest and control/influence over JV decision-making), as well as their market shares and the shares of non-member competitors, market concentration and entry barriers.
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The JV also might facilitate collusion or coordination among its members, for example, by providing a forum for communications or through formal information exchange arrangements.
Are the JV members required to purchase inputs or technology from the JV, or do they have an ability to continue to compete independently "outside" of the JV by acquiring alternative inputs and technology without compensating the JV?
If the members have the ability and incentive to compete independently outside the JV, then the ability of the JV to charge supracompetitive input prices to members or supracompetitive output prices to downstream customers may be constrained. If the individual members compete independently of the JV with non-JV technology and inputs, then the members may provide a competitive constraint to one another and the JV. For example, the Court in BMI suggested that since CBS could have transacted with individual composers for music performance rights, then BMI and ASCAP may have lacked the power to charge supracompetitive prices. JV might be considered an essential facility. 21 At the other extreme, if there are no such barriers, then the JV is less likely to harm competition by raising prices. However, entry may not cause prices to fall below the current level as would elimination of JV restraints on independent competition by JV members using reasonably priced JV inputs.
Does JV membership or JV rules restrain the ability or incentives of the JV or its members to deal with competitors outside the JV, either as customers or as input suppliers?
If so, then the JV could entail competitive harms from foreclosure, absent sufficient cognizable efficiency benefits, which suggests the need for further analysis. This concern would apply to vertical and complementary product JVs as well as horizontal JVs.
Would competitors of the JV be disadvantaged if they were to lose access to making sales to individual JV members (i.e., customer foreclosure) or obtaining the inputs or technologies provided by individual JV members (i.e., input foreclosure)?
If so, then JV restraints on such relationships would raise foreclosure concerns. 22 However, it generally is not sufficient to show harm to those competitors. It also would be necessary to show (or infer) harm to consumers.
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B. Potential Competitive Benefits
A JV and its specific restraints can lead to cognizable efficiency benefits for consumers that can dominate the competitive harms. The following questions focus on these potential competitive benefits. Under a consumer welfare standard, efficiency benefits are cognizable only if they likely would be shared with consumers, rather than simply raising the profits of the JV or its members. Section C below addresses the weighing of the benefits and harms.
12.
Are there likely significant cognizable efficiency benefits flowing from the formation and size of the JV? These benefits could include lower costs, new or higher quality products, more rapid innovation, and so on. If there are no such benefits, then a court might reasonably view a JV of actual or potential competitors as essentially a naked reduction in competition. Even if the JV is efficient, the agencies might be concerned that its membership is overly inclusive, suggesting the need to justify the membership size of the JV. 21 In this situation, the JV might cause harm by charging high prices for the inputs it provides to members and non-members. 
C. Likely Competitive Effects: Comparing Benefits and Harms
If economic analysis finds that there are both likely competitive harms and likely competitive benefits, then the net competitive effect on consumers and the competition from those conflicting forces must be determined. In economic terms, this involves the impact on market output and quality-adjusted prices. These next questions are used to evaluate the net competitive effects. These competitive effects are evaluated with respect to both the overall JV and each of the specific restraints adopted by the JV. That is, in carrying out this analysis, it is important to carefully specify two relevant competitive benchmarks, (i) the but-for world absent specific restraint(s); (ii) the but-for world absent the JV. 
